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BOOK REVIEWS
Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court.
Second Edition. By Felix Frankfurter. Cambridge: The Belk-
nap Press of Harvard University. 1961. Pp. 112. Bound in
Boards. $3.00.
This little book comprises three lectures delivered in the spring
of 1938 as part of the program of the Harvard Committee on Extra-
curricular Reading in American History and is therefore intended
for laymen rather than lawyers. Justice Frankfurter, as Professor
Frankfurter, has given us his views on Justice Holmes on several
occasions in the past.1 The present study when it first appeared in
1938 had great interest as a summing-up in brief compass of the
constitutional work of a great and striking figure in our judicial
history by his friend and disciple on the eve of the latter's taking
up the same duties on the Supreme Bench. There were, indeed, those
who ventured prophecies of Justice Frankfurter's judicial conduct
in what they here and elsewhere in his writings read between the
lines.2
The book, long out of print, has lost none of its value in the
intervening years and now appears in its second edition under the
imprint of Harvard's Belknap Press (which, like Oxford's Clarendon
Press, is reserved for the more scholarly worls) on the eve, as it
happens, of Justice Frankfurter's retirement from the court in his
eightieth year. The new edition includes a valuable addition, the
sympathetic and illuminating biography of Holmes by Justice Frank-
furter which first appeared in 1944 in the Dictionary of American
Biography (Supp. One, vol. XXI). The only other changes are
minor, the omission of the appendices on "Cases holding State action
invalid under the 14th Amendment," and regrettably, the original
'The Constitutional Opinions of Justice Holmes, 29 HARv. L. Iv. 683
(1916); Twenty Years of Mr. Justice Holmes' Constitutional Opinions, 36
HARv. L. REv. 909 (1923); Mr. Justice Holmes and the Constitution, 41
HARv. L. IEv. 121 (1927). The last is reprinted in substance in the volume
edited by him: MR. JUST=IC HOLMES (1931).
2 For instance, see Professor Walton Hamilton's almost word-by-word
analysis of this book, of the articles edited by Professor Frankfurter on
Justice Brandeis in 1932, and of his book THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER
MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE (1937), in Preview of a Justice, 48 YALE
L.J. 819 (1939).
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dedication to Justice Cardozo, "rightful successor" of Holmes; and
the addition of a brief Foreword by Professor Freund and of a new
frontispiece portrait of Holmes. The book's format is handsome,
but certainly two errors should not have been reproduced, one in a
Latin phrase in the original D.A.B. essay (p. 22), and the other in
a proper name in the Lectures (p. 86).
Holmes, of course, came of old American stock. Of those origins
the author speaks sparingly in the Lectures, fully in the biography.
But no one who has ever sat with that great man in the high, book-
lined rooms of his house in I Street and heard him discourse on
the War of Secession and the part he took in it, on his father and his
writings, and on his mother's tales of early New England customs,
could ever come away uncertain of the vital part those origins and
experiences played in his own make-up. As a man who had fought
to save the Union, the Constitution had for him, as it had for the
Founding Fathers after the struggle which established the nation, a
reality born of a sharp experience. But, although so essentially
American, he was also a philosopher and a Citizen of the World,
whose studies in legal history and realistic approach and regard for
the social ends of law freed him from all meaningless bonds of
precedent. In constitutional matters his freedom from a priori
economic concepts, his respect for the State's expressed command-
foi- he was a Hobbesian to the last, always insistent that "some
play must be allowed for the joints of the machine" 3 and ready to
treat legislative action, however doubtful in wisdom, as a social
laboratory experiment 4 -the metaphor varied but the principle
remained constant; his wide tolerance of the opinions of individual,
citizens when their expression came into collision with the power of
the State; and his unshaken belief, when one leaves the field of limita-
tions on the states and looks to the express powers conferred on the
general government, that the Constitution, despite the belief of some
of its founders that 150 years would mark its ultimate usefulness,
was still sufficiently elastic as an organic law to meet the needs of a
growing and changing people; all these seemingly various but philo-
sophically consistent attitudes shocked certain people, including some
',Missouri, K. &,T. Ry. v. May, 194 U.S. 267- (1904).
'See Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 343 (1921) (dissent).
Mr. Gorham, of Connecticut, in the Federal Constitutional Convention,
8 Aug. 1787, MADISON'S NoTEs ON TrHE DEBATES 359 (Gaillard Hunt's ed.
1920). .I
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of his brethren on the Bench, while with others they earned for him
the not always discriminating label of "Liberal." In the latter
aspect he now figures, like another St. Francis of Assisi, in the
frescoes of the buildings of Government.
In a brief introductory chapter the author exposes the fact,
familiar to lawyers but not always so clear to laymen, that certain
constitutional clauses leave much to the predilections, economic, po-
litical, and social, of the individual judge. There fell to Chief Justice
Marshall, Holmes once said, "the greatest place that ever was filled
by a judge."' Thereby our Federal system became a reality. Taney's
great work modified but did not undo the fabric. A century after
Marshall, Holmes came to the court, and although it cannot be said
that his personality ever dominated its decisions as did Marshall's,
his ideas, whether expressed as the Court's or in the isolation of dis-
sent, soon sowed seeds which have long borne fruit in the three main
fields of the Court's functions: of property in its relation to society,
of civil liberties and the individual, and of the federal system. Pro-
fessor Frankfurter devotes a chapter to each.
The rise of great corporate wealth and private fortunes, the
economic policy of laissez-faire, and the shibboleth of the "liberty of
contract" on the one side, and -on the other the attempts at social
reform by legislation-necessarily empirical in their nature, asym-
metrical in their scope, and variously vulnerable to those of too liberal
logic-these things bespoke the age of Theodore Roosevelt, with
the added fact of significance that the great power of the Federal
Government which had hitherto lain dormant was then first positively
exerted toward social betterment. Throughout this strenuous era
bf the "Square Deal," the period of the "New Freedom" and the
years of "Normalcy" which followed, Holmes treated the Constitution
as a broad charter of powers, elastic enough to meet the present and
the future, and again and again denied that it embodied any set of
opinions, partisan and "by no means . . . held semper ubique et ab
omnibus."7 His dissenting opinions in the Bakers' Maximum Hours
case," the Women's Minimum Wage case,9 the Arizoina Picketing
Speech from the Bench on John Marshall, HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL
PAPERS 266, 270 (1920).
" Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606, 609 (1903).
" Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 74 (1905) (dissent).
'Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 567 (1923) (dissent).
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case,"° the State Tax cases of his last years,"' to mention only a few,
are -now classical. In all this there was nothing doctrinaire about
his espousal of the cause of the common man, of the property-less,
such as we frequently find in the opinions of even so good a judge as
Brandeis, but there was a strong and steady belief in the power of
Congress and of State legislatures to choose such a course as new
social or economic conditions might seem to demand. But none can
convict him of a simple faith in the ultimate wisdom of legislators.
He very firmly believed in .giving them, as he said in Truax v. Cor-
rigan,2 however "futile or even noxious" he might regard their
social hypothesis, full laboratory room for experiment in the "in-
sulated chambers afforded by the several states." His innate scepti-
cism and lofty detachment, with its implicit confidence in the demo-
cratic process, perhaps never received finer expression than in his
famous dissent in that case. At another time he pungently expressed
his doubt of social panaceas by the remark that "the notion that with
socialized property we should have women free and a piano for every-
body seems to me an empty humbug."" Professor Frankfurter
gently intimates something of Holmes's detachment at the end of
this chapter, but nowhere is there forcibly brought out the profound
philosophical cleavage between him and such judges, to take polar
opposites in economic and social views, as Brandeis and McReynolds.
On the other hand, when it came to civil liberties, Justice Holmes
was not always so ready, as Professor Frankfurter points out, to
accord to state action that provisional validity, often dependent upon
so many factors of time and place known only to the legislators,
recognition of which he thought so necessary in social and economic
experiments. Freedom of speech, he felt, can never, except under
the most extreme circumstances of national danger, be safely abridged
in a free country. 4 Philosophers cannot flourish where thinking is
to become governmentally canalized. Just so,Thomas Jefferson, a
10 Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 343 (1921) (dissent).
1' Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 264 Q1920) (dissent); Schlesinger v. Wis-
consin, 270 U.S. 241 (1926) (dissent); Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Min-
nesota, 280 U.S. 216 (1930) (dissent); Hoeper v. State Tax Commission,
284 U.S. 218 (1931) (dissent).
1257 U.S. 343 (1921) (dissent).13 Ideals and Doubts, HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 303, at 307(1920).
"' Compare the Court's opinion per Holmes, J., in Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) with his dissent in Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 624 (1919).
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philosopher- and freethinker himself, had always before him the
menace of an established religion, not only as a taker of tithes but
also as a trammeler of thought. A healthy scepticism, the habit of
doubting one's own first premises, was the beginning of wisdom, but
the free expression of one's ideas, and the natural selection of the
ideas fittest to survive in the competition of the market-place alone
would guarantee that condition of "liberty" so essential to social
progress by trial and error; or, for that matter, so essential to make
a free man's life worth living. Holmes, therefore, thought and spoke
of the Bill of Rights in terms of absolutes and not relatives. No
higher expression of that faith can be found than in his dissents in
Abrams's'5 and in Schwimmer's 6 cases. Equally zealous was he inpreserving the right of "due process" as that term was understood by
its framers, to mean a fair trial according to lawY He once said
that he never passed the old State House in Boston without recalling
that there James Otis argued against the writs of assistance;", and
this traditional regard for the law of the land as a bulwark against
despotism, however benevolent the despot's guise, quickened the con-
science of the American people, and, when in his latteir years it came
to be fully appreciated by them, more than anything else earned him
a popularity which John Wilkes himself might have envied.
The third aspect of a Supreme Court Justice's functions, main-
taining the Federal balance, we have already touched on in defining
Justice Holmes's attitude toward the Union. Of the two clauses of
the Constitution which still today retain their pristine energy, one
confers a positive power on the general government, while the other
'limits federal, and in its later context, state, power. Of the .due
process clauses enough has already been said. Of the commerce
clause and its phases of growth this is not the place to speak beyond
saying that no one has more brilliantly analyzed them than Professor
Frankfurter in his Chapel Hill lectures.'9 Holmes, as is well known,
found in the Congressional prohibition of child-made goods in inter-
state commerce no unwarranted assumption of power.2" Nor could
• S4Spra note 14.
"e United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 653 (1929) (dissent).
"7 See Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 345 (1915) (dissent),
" Speech from-the Bench on John Marshall, HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL
PAPERS 266 (1920).
• 1FRANxFuRTER, THE COMMERCE -CLAUSE- UNDER MARSHALL, -TANEY AND
WAITE (1937) (The Well Lectures on American Citizenship, 936)- "
' See Hammer v,-Dageniart, .247 US.' 277 (1918) (dihsjit,. ", -.' "
,1963]
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he find an "invisible radiation" from the tenth amendment which
would forbid the federal government to protect migratory birds under
a treaty.21 On the other hand, he believed that interstate commerce
must pay its way ;22 and he did not shrink from upholding state taxes
which did not unfairly discriminate against such commerce. This,
like most questions worth while discussing in the law, as he often
said, was a question of degree, and abstractions were not to rule
concrete cases. Thus he sought always to maintain that delicate
equilibrium between the paramount sovereign and the states which
is the essence of federalism. Only when the Union's might is di-
rectly touched by some state statute does one see in one's mind's eye,
as one reads (as in that noble passage on national power Missouri v.
Hollan 42 ), the tall, old form stiffen, the white mustaches bristle and
the eyes sparkle with anger; and then one recalls that this man was
seriously wounded at Ball's Bluff, at Sharpsburg, and at Marye's
Heights (Chancellorsville Campaign) in the cause of preserving that
Union; -all wounds, he once told the writer, which his body would
bear to the grave; and one remembers again that of his long life
of service his laconic epitaph records but two facts:
CAPTAIN AND BREVET COLONEL
20TH MASS. VOL. INF., CIVIL WAR
JUSTICE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
Professor Frankfurter-the old title still comes familiarly to the
pen of one who sat in his classroom-has clearly shown us how justly
Holmes is to be regarded as "A4 &V8pc6v. 24 He quotes amply from
Holmes's opinions and writes with his usual felicity. If it cannot
always be said of the disciple, as Sir Frederick Pollock once said
of the master, that his style is as simple as Sterne's at his best,2 5 it
may truthfully be said that it is almost as colorful as Cardozo's and
has its own peculiar power.
One word more by way of epilogue. Thirty years have elapsed
since Justice Holmes retired from the Supreme Court. Much
water has since run over the judicial dam. But judges have the
' Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
"See Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. v. Texas, 210 U.S. 225 (1908) (dissent).
"'252 U.S. 416 (1920).
Lord of men. An heroic epithet used in the Iliad for Agamemnon-ED.
NOTE.
"'Ad Multos Annos, 31 COLUM. L. REv. 349, 351 (1931).
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same tendencies today that they had in Holmes's day. One of the
most dangerous of these is the tendency to legislate. As Professor
Frankfurter said in the original lectures:
Therefore, whenever he upheld, as he so often did, legislation
in the substance of which he disbelieved, he exhibited the
judicial function at its purest. He transcended his own
preferences, for he was the guardian of the country's past,
present, and future.... From the constitutional opinions of
Mr. Justice Holmes there emerges the conception of a nation
adequate to its national and international duties, consisting
of federated states in their turn possessed of ample power for
the diverse uses of a civilized people. He was mindful of the
Union . . . ; he was equally alert to assure scope for the
states upon which the Union rests.2"
Years later as Justice Frankfurter, in his D.A.B. biography, reprinted
in this volume, he says the same thing in almost the same words but
more at lengthy
Much more recently one of the greatest of all American judges,
the late Justice Learned Hand, in his brilliant Oliver Wendell Holmes
Lectures before the Harvard Law School, after examining the slender
constitutional grounds upon which the power of judicial review of
legislative acts, or those of the President, rests, and after reviewing
many of the Supreme Court's decisions arising out of the first
eight amendments and the fourteenth in the effort to determine in
which the Court had sought merely to keep Congress or the states
within their proper legislative roles, and those in which it had sub-
stituted its own reappraisal of the relative values at stake and thus
had overruled the "legislative judgment" of the state, concludes with
these words:
I must therefore conclude this part of what I have to
say by acknowledging that I do not know what the doctrine is
as to the scope of these clauses; I cannot frame any definition
that will explain when the Court will assume the role of a
third legislative chamber and when it will limit its authority
to keeping Congress and the states within their accredited
authority. Nevertheless, I am quite clear that it has not
6 FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTIcE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT 110-11.
27 Id. at 21-23.
19631
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
abdicated its former function, as to which I hope that it may
be regarded as permissible for me to say that I have never
been able to understand on what basis it does or can rest
except as a coup de main.
And near the conclusion of his last lecture, he continues:
Moreover, it certainly does not accord with the underlying
presuppositions of popular government to vest in a chamber,
unaccountable to anyone but itself, the power to suppress
social experiments which it does not approve. Nothing, I
submit, could warrant such a censorship except a code of
paramount law that not only measured the scope of legislative
authority but regulated how it should be exercised.
. . . For myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by
a bevy of Platonic Guardians, even if I knew how to choose
them, which I assuredly do not .... Of course I know how
illusory would be the belief that my vote determined anything;
but nevertheless when I go to the polls I have a satisfaction
in the sense that we are all engaged in a common venture.
If you retort that a sheep in the flock may feel something
like it; I reply, following Saint Francis, 'My brother, the
Sheep.'29
May we not hope, then, that Justice Holmes's great example of
judicial restraint, so ably set forth by Justice Frankfurter, may help
to bring back "the Guardians" to their proper role, and thus avoid
decisions which are so contrary to the mores of the people affected
that they must be enforced by the bayonet, -or else raise proposals
of constitutional amendment to remove the questions from judicial
cognizance? Is not government by the consent of the governed still
an ideal to be sought in a free world?
MANGUM WEEKS
MEMBER OF THE BAR
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
2SHAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS '55 (1938) (The Oliver Wendell Holmes
Devise ,Lectures).
29 Id. at 73-4.
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Reconstruction Bonds and Twentieth-Century Politics: South Dakota
v. Worth Carolina (1904).
By Robert .F. Durden. Durham: Duke University Press. 1962.
Pp. xi, 274. Illustration, index. $6.00.
Robert F. Durden, Associate Professor of History at Duke Uni-
versity, has unravelled a tangled skein of legal history that would
challenge the ingenuity of a Philadelphia lawyer. But it was a
Wilmington lawyer (and rice planter) who contrived the whole out-
landish, thing-Daniel Lindsay Russell, the last- Republican- governor
of the state and the central figure in this book. Many a reputation
was tarnished in the course of the affair, but Russell, bold and hot-
tempered, yet withal shrewd and perservering even through a fatal
illness, emerged from the episode the noblest rascal of. them all.
As a young Confederate veteran, Russell, like many another old
Whig, had gone Republican. A political career that seemed fore-
shortened by the end of Reconstruction reached its unexpected
apogee in 1896 with his election as governor when the Populists
divided the former Democratic vote. But Russell's triumph proved
his torment, forcing him to deal first with a mismatched Populist-
Republican majority and then a hostile Democratic majority in the
legislature, to face the violent Democratic red shirt campaigns of
-1898 and 1900 (including the revolutionary overthrow of the Re-
pitblican city government in Wilmington), and'finally to leave office
almost insolvent because of the meager salary.
Before he left office Russell had already hatched out and begun to
nurture the scheme that finally brought on the strange legal con-
frontation of North Carolina and South Dakota. His dual ob-
jectives were to -enrich Daniel Russell (and others wlo were drawn
into his net) and -at the same time embarrass his Democratic tor-
mentors. The plan centered upon Southern state bonds that had
been repudiated or scaled down after Reconstruction, an action based
largely upon charges of Republican fraud and corruption. It" cen-
tered particularly upon a North Carolina issue of 1866-1867 (just
before radical reconstruction). Each of-these bonds,'issued to finance
the Western -North Carolina Railroad, was secured by a second
mortgage on ten shares of stock in the older North Carolina Railroad.
(The first mortgage secured certain antebellum bonds.) - -In -:1879
the Democrats had scaled down the "t n share" bonds from $1,000
-to $250. on the excuse -of- inability to pay. The settlement was ac-
1963]
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cepted by most of the bondholders, but 234 shares continued to be
held by the stubborn Schafer Brothers, bankers of New York, who
had no legal recourse because of the state's immunity to private
suit in the federal courts under the eleventh amendment.
Russell's "unpatented invention" was to have a portion of the
bonds donated outright to another state which could then bring suit
in the United States Supreme Court. Winning such a suit, he
reasoned, would render the state amenable to a more favorable com-
promise on the rest of the bonds lest further donations bring further
state suits. Russell and his associates, then, could reap a harvest of
legal fees. Since there was altogether about $62,000,000 in the
repudiated principal of Southern bonds, exclusive of interest, the field
seemed ripe for a bumper crop.
Through a former law partner Russell actually approached
Schafer Brothers even before he went out of office, although he was
hot formally associated with the case until later. Then, among
others, he approached his old fusionist friend, Populist Senator
Marion Butler, who quietly lined up the sovereign state of South
Dakota through its Silver Republican Senator Richard F. Pettigrew.
Schafer Brothers donated ten of the "ten share" bonds to South
Dakota, which then proceeded to bring suit against North Carolina.
After much pulling and hauling and a tremendous political pande-
monium, all of it detailed by Durden, the case eventually was brought
to a decision early in 1904. North Carolina was ordered to pay
$27,400 or face the court ordered sale of a hundred shares of the
state owned railroad stock.
In the political clamor set up by the judgment North Carolinians
got far more heat than light from their press, particularly from the
Raleigh News and Observer. Josephus Daniels thundered his
suspicions of a non-existent plot of the Southern Railway to get
-control of the North Carolina stock and, like most Democrats, never
seemed (or never wanted) to get entirely straight the distinction
between the "ten share" bonds and the later "carpetbag" bonds.
Under the influence of Daniels, the Democratic party in 1904 pledged
'adherence to the settlement of 1879. The new governor, Robert B.
Glenn, however, proved more willing to compromise, and after deftly
neutralizing Daniels with fulsome praise, proceeded to compromise
on the basis of $892 per bond. This, it was explained, did not depart
from the party's pledge, but merely represented $250 plus accrued
[Vol. 41
BOOK REVIEWS
interest on the principal and deferred coupons over the years. In
the end, after he had paid off his expenses and associates (amid many
recriminations), Russell probably realized only about $7,000 for
himself plus a return of about $5,000 from a few bonds held by him-
self and his partner, enough to pay off his debts and leave him barely
solvent at his death in 1908.
The elusive "hundred millions" in other bonds, however, proved
in the end out of reach. Durden gives the story of efforts by Russell,
Butler, and Pettigrew, as well as two other groups, to pool them for
a subsequent assault. But it proved difficult in the Progressive Era
to find a state government willing to cooperate, especially with Demo-
cratic leaders alert to raise an outcry against efforts to collect the
tainted "carpetbag" bonds.
One final irony in the affair was that Butler became identified in
the Democratic propaganda as its author, and that after he went
over to the Republicans in 1904, the issue of Butler and bonds be-
came a favorite weapon in the Democratic arsenal over the next
decade.
It is as curious and fascinating a tale of avarice and partisanship
as exists in the history of any state, but it probably never could
have been brought to light in all its complexity but for the fact that
Russell's young partner preserved a trunkful of the papers that
were acquired by the Southern Historical Collection at the University
of North Carolina after his death in 1959. Professor Durden,
delving into the manuscripts for material pertinent to a study of
Marion Butler, soon realized that the papers presented a detailed
inside picture of the bond case. The result is a model of compressed,
lucid, and witty writing that represents the historical monograph 'at
its best.
GEORGE B. TINDALL
PROFESSOR OF HISTORY
UNIVERSITY OF NORTHa CAROLINA
BOOKS RECENTLY RECEIVED
The Genius of Lemuel Shaw.
By Elijah Adlow. Boston: Mass. Bar Association. 1962. 'Pp.
vi, 388. $5.00.
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Interstate Apportionment of Business Income for State Income Tax
Purposes with specific reference to North Carolina.
By Charles E. Ratliff, Jr. Chapel Hill: The University of North
Carolina Press. 1962. Pp. xii, 132. $4.00.
Law and Organization in World Society.
By Kenneth S. Carlston. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
1962. Pp. xvi, 356. $6.50.
INTENTIONAL BLANK
CI
